Lately Publiſhed.

THE *Craftſman Extraordinary*, being Remarks on a late Pamphlet intitled, *Obſervations on the Conduct of* Great Britain, *&c.* Publiſh'd by CALEB D'ANVERS, *Eſq*; Printed for R. FRANCKLIN:

Of whom may be had,

1. Some Conſiderations on the *National Debts*, the *Sinking Fund*, and the *State of Publick Credit*; in a Letter to a Friend in the Country.

——— *Male verum examinat omnis*
Corruptus Judex —— HOR.

2. A State of the *National Debt*, as it ſtood *December* the 24*th*, 1716; with the Payments made towards the Diſcharge of it out of the *Sinking Fund*, &c. compared with the Debt at *Michaelmas*, 1725.

3. Remarks on a late Book, intitled, *An Eſſay on the Publick Debts of this Kingdom*, &c. in which the evil Tendency of that Book, and the Deſign of its Author, are fully detected and expos'd: Being a ſeaſonable Warning to the People of *Great-Britain*, againſt ſuch Authors, and ſuch Books.

Hunc Tu, Romane, *Caveto.* HOR.

In a Letter to a Member of the Houſe of Commons.

(3)

THE *Motives* and *Designs* OF THE Vienna Alliance EXAMINED.

IN A

LETTER

TO

Mr. *D'ANVERS.*

Accipe daque fidem, ſunt nobis fortia bello
Pectora, ſunt animi, & rebus ſpectata juventus.
Virg.

LONDON:

Printed for J. ROBERTS in *Warwick-Lane*, and ſold at the *Pamphlet-ſhops* of *London* and *Weſtminſter*. 1729. (Price 6d.)

BODLEIANA BIBLIOTHECA

22

THE

MOTIVES and DESIGNS

OF THE

VIENNA ALLIANCE

EXAMINED, *&c.*

SIR,

THE *Vienna* Alliance has given so great a Turn to the Affairs of *Europe*, and so particularly affected the State of this Nation, that I think it can't be too diligently examined and canvast, in order to satisfy all who have a true regard to the Common Interest, and who desire to know whether the measures taken on the part of *Great Britain* have been right; for whe-

ther they have been proper for the Preſervation of our Rights and Priviledges, and the Eſtabliſhment of our Proſperity, in a ſafe and honourable Peace, very much depends upon the Projects form'd between the *Emperor* and *Spain* in this Alliance.

I confeſs your friends, who have examined this Affair with great earneſtneſs and Application, and have repreſented their opinion with conſiderable Advantage, ſeem to have overlooked ſome Things of no ſmall Moment in this Enquiry; and after all their Pains, to fall ſhort of that Evidence and Harmony of Circumſtances, requiſite to a full Conviction. I beg leave therefore to ſuggeſt a few Conſiderations, that ſeem to affect the Scheme you have ſo warmly patroniſed, and for this reaſon have choſe to addreſs them to you.

The principal Cauſe of this ſudden Conjunction between the *Emperor* and King of *Spain*, is ſaid to be a *Jealouſy that the Court of* France *would ſend back the* Infanta. At the ſame time we are not informed in a material point, whether the Proſpect of this grievous Inſult or Rupture, or whatever you think fit to call it, was judg'd to be certain or founded only in Conjecture; the former ſeems leſs probable, becauſe in that caſe the *Spaniards* might have tryed ſome Meaſures or other to have prevented it. And yet it muſt be certain, or elſe the *Spaniards* muſt blame themſelves for being acceſſory to it, by taking ſuch Meaſures, for near ſix Months beforehand, as could not but provoke *France* to this fatal Step; by treating ſeparately at the Court of *Vienna*, contrary to Engagements to that Crown: Your Friend

Friend therefore very judiciouſly calls it *almoſt a certain Proſpect* p. 42.

But let this be as it will, this Account ſeems to be attended with greater Difficulties; for what ſhould induce *Spain* to ſhew their Reſentment of this Affront by Meaſures prejudicial to themſelves, and that had no Manner of Tendency to make them any Reparation? Is this the Way for Princes to revenge themſelves, by flying with great Advantages to their Enemies, and plunging themſelves into a worſe Condition than before? No Reaſons of State, at leaſt, can be thought to ſuggeſt ſuch Methods.

It is therefore neceſſary to make this Account plauſible, that this Affront ſhould be taken as an Introduction to future Hoſtilities. Accordingly the *Craftsman Extraordinary* p. 32. calls it a *Rupture*; and *p.* 43. ſays *it muſt be conſidered as a neceſſary breach with* France, *at leaſt for a time.* This is ſpoke with ſome caution, but the neceſſity of a Breach is the Foundation of this Scheme, and therefore ought to have been better ſupported than by meer Suppoſitions. Indeed the *Spaniards* might put what Conſtructions they pleaſed upon it. The Affront was juſt as much as they thought fit to make of it. But if we conſider that diſtant Steps only were hitherto taken, that the *French* Court gave their Reaſons for not proceeding in the Match, which was diſagreeable to the whole Nation; that the Juſtneſs and Weight of their Reaſons were acknowledg'd every where, and that *Spain* began with affronting *France* by treating at *Vienna*, and there will appear no ſuch Reaſon for apprehending the Neceſſity of future Hoſtilities on the

the part of *France*, and hardly any Grounds for more violent Reſentment on the part of *Spain* than what was anſwered by ſending back the Queen. For Reaſons given by *France* if they were of any moment, and given with a Deſign to pacify *Spain*, ought in a great Meaſure to alleviate the Affront, and to prevent all further Apprehenſions.

But ſuppoſing the Affront to be ever ſo great, and if you pleaſe intolerable, where was the Neceſſity of *Spain*'s ſubmitting to the *Emperor?* It was more likely that *France*, who could have no Views in quarrelling with *Spain* at this Juncture, would have ſoftned, rather than purſued them with freſh Inſults. The Houſe of *Bourbon* would hardly have proceeded to ſhew needleſs Contempt and Indignities to a Prince of their own Blood, nor any Miniſtry in *France* have ventured to quarrel with one of that Line without very powerful Reaſons. The Thing therefore how grievous ſoever at preſent, muſt ſoon have vaniſhed, and *Spain* could hardly apprehend any further Conſequences than what aroſe from their own Diſappointment.

Nay let us ſuppoſe this Proceeding of the *French* Court did *throw* Spain *into ſuch Circumſtances of Diſtreſs, as ſhe was to prevent by all poſſible means.* The Queſtion then will ariſe, whether ſuch an Alliance as was concluded at *Vienna*, was the *proper Means*, or the *only Means* left to prevent this Diſtreſs: And whether the *Spaniards* had thoſe Notions of it.

In the *firſt* Place, *Spain* was in as great Diſtreſs before, and never attempted any ſuch Methods to get

get out of it. When the Quadruple Alliance was formed, and the chief Powers of *Europe* were under Engagements to enter upon Hoſtilities againſt her, *Spain* ſtood alone for a conſiderable time, and refuſed to comply with much eaſier Terms; nay tho' theſe Hoſtilities were actually begun, and *Spain* felt ſome very ſharp Effects of her Enemy's Power and Anger, yet ſhe would not preſently yield, tho' much leſs was required than what ſhe voluntarily and with great Submiſſion offered to the *Emperor* at *Vienna*; How comes ſhe now to be ſo deſirous of her Security upon much ſo leſs Reaſon?

For *ſecondly*, at this time *Spain* was not bereaved of Friends as your Correſpondent ſuggeſts, but had very powerful ones, and ſuch as could not ſet ſtill and ſee *France* affront her firſt, and then purſue this Affront with a Rupture. Beſides *France* could have no Temptation to ſuch Meaſures, *England* and *Holland* too were her faithful Allies, and all thoſe Powers, together with *Sardinia*, in friendly Treaties with *Spain*; in ſhort, if ſhe had one Enemy in the World, it was he, who according to theſe Principles of your Correſpondent, is ſingled out to protect her againſt imaginary Inſults, Fear of a Rupture, and Jealouſy that one Affront might be followed by another.

Nay to make this Account probable, the ſame Author finds it neceſſary to ſuppoſe, that *the* Emperor's *Friendſhip was to be purchaſed by* Spain *at any Rate*, and indeed this muſt be the Caſe, or his Account will fall to the Ground. But upon what is this Neceſſity founded? becauſe Spain *was deſerted on all Sides*. If this was true, it would ſerve for one

one Step towards eſtabliſhing his Scheme; but from what has been already ſaid, it appears, that the contrary bids fairer for Truth, *that ſhe was deſerted by none.* The Quadruple Alliance then ſubſiſting, by which *Spain* was united with all the contracting Powers, and all engag'd *to defend each other's Subjects and Eſtates, and to maintain Peace,* and this Treaty was not yet violated on any Side. *Sending back the* Infanta was an Affair not at all affected by it, and whatever was the Intention, yet its certain nothing was actually done Time enough to influence the Treaty at *Vienna.*

However its plain *Spain* did purchaſe the *Emperor's* Friendſhip, as if they thought it as neceſſary as this Author ſuppoſes, who very prudently on ſome Accounts has adopted the *courſe of Events* for the Proof of his Aſſertion, and very juſtly too, if he would but clearly make out the Connection with the Cauſes he aſſigns; for to ſupport this Argument it is neceſſary to ſhew by ſeveral Steps, that *ſending back the Infanta* drove *Spain* to this cruel Neceſſity of *purchaſing the Emperor's Friendſhip at any rate,* wherein your Friend ſeems to have dropt us.

On the other hand, If *ſending back the Infanta* did not ſeparate *France* from *Spain,* but it was rather their own Improvement of Fears and Jealouſies concerning it: If it was treating clandeſtinely at *Vienna* contrary to Engagements, that began the Separation; and concluding a Treaty contrary to the Intereſt of *France* and her Allies, that made a Separation neceſſary; then *ſending back the Infanta* did not force *Spain* to the *Emperor.*

Again

Again, if *ſending back the Infanta* did not alienate *Great Britain*, nor *Holland*, nor any other Ally from *Spain* in the leaſt; then *ſending back the Infanta* did not neceſſitate *Spain* to fly to the *Emperor* at all, much leſs *to purchaſe his Friendſhip at any rate*; and I think it has not been ſo much as pretended, that this Step of *France* did influence any other Power to deſert *Spain*, nor do I know how it ſhould.

But if we conſider what *Spain* gave for this Purchaſe, it may give us ſome further Light in examining the Scheme of your Friend; and it really coſt them ſo dear, that if they were compel'd to it, we may reaſonably conclude it was by ſomething very *terrible* and *threatning*. But if they voluntarily choſe it, which ſeems to be really the Caſe, they muſt have had very different Views and Motives, than what your Friend has aſſign'd.

That they were not compel'd by any kind of Neceſſity to purchaſe this Friendſhip, is evident becauſe there was no viſible Power, nor Danger, nor Engagement to hurt them, that could be thought to have ſuch a terrible Effect; at leaſt ſending back the *Infanta* could not, becauſe this had no Tendency to provoke or to arm *France*; nor any other Power, againſt *Spain*; or if it had, the Meaſures taken by *Spain* at the Court of *Vienna*, muſt aggravate the Thing they feared.

But if *Spain* was ſo fond of the *Emperor*'s Friendſhip at this time, as to think they could not ſubſiſt without it, which ſeems the only Neceſſity left, that could influence them, they might have had it up-

on much eaſier and better Terms, than by making their Court at *Vienna*; for by this Method

1. They gave up their chief Pretenſions at *Cambray*. Pretenſions which they inſiſted upon with great *Zeal* and *Reſolution*, through the Courſe of that tedious Congreſs; and though for many Years before, they choſe to be at a vaſt Expence, and to be reduced to great *Diſtreſs* rather than yield what they did then; yet now ſtick at nothing. 1. The Right of Reverſion to the Kingdom of *Sicily* reſerved to the Crown of *Spain* by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and very juſtly inſiſted upon by them at *Cambray*, according to the Quadruple Alliance, was by the Treaty of *Vienna* yielded to the *Emperor*. 2. The favourite Title of *Catholick King*, which *Spain* with great Zeal inſiſted ſhould be relinquiſhed by the *Emperor*, was granted him for his Life, and 3. A Matter of much greater Conſequence than either, which was the Guaranty of the Succeſſion of all the *Emperor*'s Hereditary Dominions, by which *Spain* has repoſed the higheſt Confidence in the *Emperor*, and left it in a great meaſure to him to chooſe his Succeſſor in the Empire; which is known almoſt entirely to depend upon it. Whether *ſending back the Infanta*, or ſome Views of the Spaniſh Court to gain this Advantage at laſt to themſelves, had the greater Sway in this Step, I ſhall not determine.

2. *Spain* broke with her old Friends the *Engliſh* and *Dutch* to gain this new Friendſhip with the *Emperor*. What could compel them to ſuch Meaſures? Or what Connection is there between *ſending back the Infanta*, and ſacrificing the Alliance and Friendſhip

of

of two ſuch Powers? a Friendſhip of greater Advantage to *Spain* at any time, and eſpecially in the preſent Juncture, than the moſt ſanguine Stateſman would think of gaining from the *Emperor*, without Views of new Acquiſitions by acting offenſively.

Great Britain was upon very good terms with *Spain*, by the Treaty of *Madrid* 1721. which ought particularly to be explained, becauſe it is of uſe in conſidering the other Motive, aſſign'd for this New Alliance; and becauſe the Comments your Friend has made upon this Treaty, without any juſt Foundation, are the great Supports of his Scheme.

By the ſecond Article of it, the Treaties of Peace and Commerce, concluded at *Utrecht*, are confirmed and ratified; all except the 3d. 5th. and 8th Articles of the ſaid Treaty, which have been annulled by vertue of a later Treaty, concluded at *Madrid* 1715. *&c.* Theſe Exceptions are Explications of ſome things in our favour, by which we are put upon a better foot with *Spain*, than by the Peace of *Utrecht*. And no Exception being made herein relating to *Gibraltar*, though other Exceptions were made for which there was any reaſon, *viz.* becauſe they were alter'd by later Compacts. It is evident there was no reaſon for any Exception about *Gibraltar*, that the Propriety of it is alter'd by no later Compacts, and conſequently that it is by this Treaty again very ſtrongly confirmed to us.

But in order to render this Matter dubious, we are told, at leaſt it is inſinuated, that a *private Article was annexed to this Treaty, ſtipulating the contents*

of a Letter to be writ by the late King about the Reſtitution of Gibraltar. It is plain enough what Rumours might give a foundation for the Intelligence of your Friend, but it is not probable ſuch an Article could belong to this Treaty, becauſe it is directly contrary to an expreſs publick Article, and therefore could give the Spaniards no manner of Right; and all their Pretenſions founded on ſuch a private Article, would be fully anſwered by the expreſs tenour of a contrary publick one. And if this pretended Article was never ſigned, it could be of no more force than if it never did exiſt, and being never publiſhed, nor inſiſted upon by the Spaniards, can hardly be thought ever to have been.

However this Inſinuation ſeems to be ſupported ſomething further, or to carry a Suſpicion, that there is ſomething in it, from an expreſs Proviſion in this Treaty to keep it ſecret, in theſe Words: *The preſent Treaty ſhall be in force immediately after the Ratification, and the Publication of it deferr'd, 'till the Concluſion of the Peace at* Cambray. But the Reaſon of concealing it was plainly this, that the *Emperor* might not take the leaſt Umbrage at it, and think both the Mediators too much engag'd to *Spain*; for it is evident from the *Courſe of Events*, that there was ſufficient Reaſon for this Proviſion, and that it was rightly judged in Order to facilitate the Project of Peace; becauſe the *Emperor* did actually make heavy Complaints of this Kind, notwithſtanding this Treaty was kept ſecret from him.

But the very Words of this Treaty are artfully brought to ſhew, that there was Room left to diſ-

pute

pute the Reſtitution of *Gibraltar* among *the Pretenſions not ſettled* by it. But there is not the leaſt Reaſon, nor Colour for the Turn this Author has given to the words he has quoted: Nor can I ſee how any Man, who reads the Treaty it ſelf, can imagine, any Queſtion or Diſpute can poſſibly ariſe from it about *Gibraltar*; unleſs he is previouſly reſolved to ſpy it out, and to diſtort the true Meaning of Words to ſerve his Purpoſe.

The *fourth* and *fifth* Articles relate to the Reſtitution of the Effects ſeiz'd in the late War between *Great Britain* and *Spain*, Art. 5. in theſe Words: *It is likewiſe regulated, that his Britannick Majeſty ſhall reſtore to his Catholick Majeſty, all the Veſſels of the* Spaniſh *Fleet, taken by the* Britiſh *in the late Engagement on the Coaſt of* Sicily, *Aug.* 1718, *with the Cannons, Sails, Tackling and other Equipments, in the ſame Condition they are at preſent; or in Caſe they have been ſold, the Value; according to the Price for which they were ſold, as it appears upon ſufficient Proof: And to execute this Reſtitution, his Britannick Majeſty ſhall give the neceſſary Orders immediately after the Ratification of the ſaid Treaty. It is likewiſe declared, that other Pretenſions ſhall be treated of, at the future Congreſs of* Cambray, *which may be on both Sides between the two Crowns concerning the Affairs*, which are not expoſed in the preſent Treaty, *and* which are not comprehended in the ſecond Article above.

Theſe Pretenſions, therefore, are plainly limited to theſe two Things, 1. Such as are *not expoſed in the preſent Treaty*, but the whole Treaty of *Utrecht* is ſo far expoſed, that it is ſaid to be confirm'd and ratified

fied by this, and all the Exceptions made to it, are herein particularly ſpecified; therefore by the ſtrongeſt Reaſon we may conclude, what is not excepted, remains as it did before: There is no Rule of interpreting Treaties more certain than this. No Exception therefore being made relating to *Gibraltar*, it remains as it did before, ſecur'd to *Great Britain*, as fully as Treaties could do it. 2. Thoſe Pretenſions relate to things *not comprehended in the ſecond Article of this Treaty*; but *Gibraltar* is comprehended in the *ſecond* Article, becauſe it is comprehended in the Treaty of *Utrecht*, which is ratify'd by that Article; and no Exceptions being made about *Gibraltar*, tho' all Exceptions made to the ſaid Treaty are here particularly ſpecified; it could not therefore be more certainly comprehended, if it had been particularly mention'd; for all the Parties concerned in this Treaty, as certainly knew that *Gibraltar* was yielded to *Great Britain* by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, as if the Treaty it ſelf had been before their Eyes with theſe Words: *The Catholick King does yield to the Crown of* Great Britain *the full and entire Propriety of the Town and Caſtle of* Gibraltar.

But this Author, who has an excellent Talent at raiſing a Miſt, has another Chance; for how comes it to paſs, that *other Pretenſions ſhould be particularly ſpecified*, and ſome that are of much leſs Moment, and not this about *Gibraltar?* For as good a Reaſon as can be, becauſe *Spain* had real and juſt Pretenſions to thoſe other Things, but none at all to *Gibraltar*: For whoever will take the Pains to read the Treaty, will immediately ſee, that the ſecond Article of it is deſign'd, 1. To eſtabliſh and confirm thoſe

thoſe Exceptions, that have been made to the Treaty of *Utrecht* by ſubſequent Treaties, which therefore ought to be particularly ſpecified, and are ſo; and 2. To re-eſtabliſh according to the Treaty of *Utrecht*, thoſe Things which were broken into by the late War, *viz*, the free Exerciſe of the *Roman Catholick* Religion in *Minorca*, the *Newfoundland* Fiſhery, *&c.* which ought therefore particularly to be mentioned, as well as the Exceptions in the other Caſe; but *Gibraltar* being not at all affected by the Exceptions, or by the Alterations, it remains juſt as it did by the Treaty of *Utrecht*; and hitherto the *Spaniards* have no Manner of Pretenſions to it: And if not now, I can't conceive what Tranſaction ſince can give them any.

As to the Letter of the late King it has been ſufficiently ſhewn, the utmoſt they could make of it, together with Intimations given before, was to pleaſe themſelves with the Hopes that the *Britiſh* Nation might one Time or other yield this Point, if they perſiſted with Steadineſs and Reſolution to diſtreſs us; but could not convey the leaſt Right, nor lay a Foundation for any Pretenſions.

Since then the *Spaniards* had no Demands upon *Great Britain*, of this Place, when they enter'd into the Alliance at *Vienna: Spain* therefore by pretending and inſiſting upon a Right without any Foundation, and without producing any Stipulation, or Grant, or Contract to ſupport it; and making this Pretence *a Condition of Peace and Commerce* with *Great Britain*, and engaging a friendly Power and Ally to take Part with them in ſuch groundleſs Pretences

tences, contrary to Treaties, has undoubtedly ſacrificed her Friendſhip with *Great Britain* to this new Friendſhip with the *Emperor*.

This is Fact, not to be conteſted, becauſe it is Part of the Alliance it ſelf, and ſhews what *Spain* yielded to purchaſe it; but how is this connected with ſending back the *Infanta?* Why *Spain* was obliged *to purchaſe the* Emperor's *Friendſhip at any Rate*, even by ſacrificing the Friendſhip of *Great Britain*, as powerful and as uſeful a Friend as the *Emperor*, and (which I think is needleſs to prove) by ſacrificing the Friendſhip of *Holland* too.

This is the oddeſt Kind of Neceſſity that ever was, that one ſhould be obliged in any Diſtreſs, to ſacrifice more powerful and more uſeful Friends, to gain leſs powerful and leſs uſeful, and to pay a monſtrous Price for them beſides. But ſuppoſe the *Emperor*'s Friendſhip was worth both theirs; *Spain* in this Caſe might have had it without loſing either of them; for nothing was more deſirable to *Great Britain* and *Holland*, than that *Spain* ſhould be at Peace with the *Emperor:* They had uſed their utmoſt Endeavours to promote it, and were ready to do ſo again. Could *Spain* therefore be under a Neceſſity of obtaining the *Emperor*'s Friendſhip, *only* by making Enemies of theſe two Powers, at Peace both with *Spain* and the *Emperor?* Or how could ſending back the *Infanta* cauſe this Neceſſity?

3. Another Effect of the *Vienna* Alliance, which will help us to judge of the Cauſe aſſigned for it, was *Spain*'s yielding great Advantages to her antient

tient Enemy. *Spain*, who till this ſudden Change could not bear the Thoughts that the *Emperor* ſhould be Maſter of *Sicily*, and for this Reaſon withſtood the Meaſures concerted by the King of *Great-Britain*, and the Quadruple Alliance, and proteſted againſt that Scheme, becauſe the *Emperor* by ſuch an Acceſſion of Power would be able to enſlave all *Italy*, now makes no Scruple to ſurrender all that the Mediators thought reaſonable, and much more; and ſuch a Branch of Trade in the *Netherlands*, with ſuch Privileges, as would in all likelihood have enriched *his antient*, *his perſonal Enemy* to that Degree, that he would ſoon have been in a Condition to diſpute with *Spain* (if this ſudden Friendſhip ſhould happen hereafter to fail) almoſt any thing he had a mind to.

What Neceſſity could force *Spain* to ſuch extraordinary Meaſures? Or how could ſending back the *Infanta* produce ſuch a Neceſſity? If Jealouſy of a Rupture with *France* cauſed her to yield ſo great Advantages to the *Emperor*, what Security has her perſonal Enemy, the antient Enemy of her Royal Line given her, of the Firmneſs and Conſtancy of this ſudden Friendſhip? Has ſhe ſtronger Tyes with him than with the Family of *Bourbon*? Or do great Compliances knit the Bonds of Friendſhip among Princes, ſo as to cut off all further Occaſion of Fear? If ſo, *Spain* may be eaſy and happy with her new Ally: But yet with all her Fears and Jealouſies, which generally point out the moſt effectual Methods of Safety, continues as much expos'd to a Rupture with *France*, (and the Maritime Powers

too,) as ever; and hardly any better prepared for it by this Change of Allies, than before.

It may be of no great Importance, after what has been ſaid, to add, that *Spain* has ſacrific'd to this new Friendſhip her own Honour, by contradicting former Repreſentations, wherein ſhe declar'd the *Oſtend* Company *contrary to Treaties*; and that ſhe could not favour it without *injuring the Dutch*; and by violating ſolemn Engagements to other Powers; only this ſhews how cruel this Neceſſity was which your Friend has made the unhappy Cauſe of all her Proceedings. The Apology he makes for her is very agreeable to his Scheme, a Repreſentation of great Diſtreſs, *that ſhe is very ſorry and could not help it.* Tho' it would have been much more to the Purpoſe to have ſhewn clearly, whence this terrible Neceſſity aroſe, and how it led *Spain* into thoſe Meaſures ſhe has taken; but this which is the main Pillar of the whole Fabrick, does miſerably fail us.

And it looks as if your Friend was afraid it would not bear all the weight he has laid upon it, and therefore has thought fit to join another with it, perhaps of no greater Strength than the former. Indeed it would have been ſurprizing if the Conduct of *Great-Britain* ſhould have eſcaped juſt Cenſure, had any thing been done, or omitted, to deſerve it. But let us ſee whether *Refuſing the ſole Mediation* could have any Influence upon the Proceedings at *Vienna*. It is indeed very prudently ſaid to be only *acceſſory*, but that ſeems to be too much, and not ſufficiently ſupported by your Friend.

This

This Step, conſidered as a Cauſe that moved *Spain* to enter into ſuch an Alliance at *Vienna*, is liable to as many Difficulties as the former. And if the Queſtion is, whether *Great-Britain* acted a wiſe and an honourable Part, in refuſing the ſole Mediation; the Anſwer I ſuppoſe will either confirm, or overthrow the Suppoſition, that *this Refuſal* did in any meaſure determine *Spain* to enter into ſuch an Alliance: Let it therefore be conſidered,

1. *Spain* never intended *Great-Britain* ſhould be ſole Mediator, ſhe had gone another way to work, before this Offer was made, and proceeded ſo far, that this Offer could not be ſincere.

2. If it was, the *Emperor*'s Conſent was abſolutely neceſſary towards the *ſole Mediation*, who, before this Offer was thought off, found himſelf ſecure of obtaining ſuch Advantages from *Spain*, as he could never expect from any fair and reaſonable *Mediator*.

3. If it had been offer'd in time, *Great-Britain* could not have accepted it without diſobliging *France*, which had a great Tendency to embroil *Europe* in new Commotions; ſuch as the *Harmony of theſe two Powers* had hitherto prevented. And *if Jealouſy of a Rupture* with *France* drove *Spain* to treat with the *Emperor*, contrary to Engagements, ſhe could not reaſonably be diſguſted that *Great-Britain* ſhould decline a Rupture, not from *Jealouſy*, but from *Breach of Treaties*.

4. The Treaty of *London*, formed by *Great Britain* with a view to eſtabliſh the Peace of *Europe*, would by this Step have been violated, *firſt* by the Party who contriv'd it, which undoubtedly would have been very much to the Credit and Advantage of *Great-Britain* at this Juncture eſpecially, and ſo the *Imperial* and *Spaniſh* Courts might have ſaved themſelves the trouble of inventing any Excuſe for their Proceedings.

5. A new Treaty muſt have been formed and ſigned by the Powers concerned. How much time this would have taken up, and with how much Eaſe and Certainty it could have been accompliſh'd, I don't know. At the ſame time *France* muſt have been left out, paſſive and unconcerned at this Affront, or making Alliances againſt it, which undoubtedly would very much have contributed to ſettle the Repoſe of *Europe*.

6. *France* might have been particularly incens'd againſt *Great-Britain*, by whoſe joint Mediation almoſt every Step ſince the Peace of *Utrecht*, towards eſtabliſhing the common Repoſe, had been taken. And not only the Quadruple Alliance would have been diſſolved, but other Alliances formed in the *North* by their joint Mediation, would have been in very great Danger. And what Advantages might *Spain* have made of this Breach, who in all her Deſigns, to diſturb the Tranquility of *Europe*, has deſired and attempted nothing more zealouſly, than to reunite *France* and *Great-Britain*.

7. What

7. What Advantages could we have made by ſtepping between *France* and *Spain?* was it of more Conſequence towards eſtabliſhing the Peace of *Europe*, which was the main Deſign, and the principal Intereſt *Great-Britain* had in view, and in which *France* had conſtantly joined with us? Was it more proper to ſecure this End, for us to break with *France*, or to do nothing that might juſtly offend *France*, or *Spain*, ſince we had nothing to deſire of either; and if Treaties were obſerved as they ought to be, nothing to fear.

Why therefore ſhould we provoke *France* by any clandeſtine and unjuſtifiable Proceeding, in Order to gain ſome Advantages from *Spain*. But what Advantages? for we were upon as good Terms with *Spain*, as could be deſired by the Treaty of *Madrid* 1721. Some few Pretenſions only wanted to be ſettled about the Effects of the late War. Or ſhould we do this to prevent any Dangers ariſing at *Vienna*: But what Dangers? It was no Detriment to *Great Britain*, that *Spain* and the *Emperor* ſhould agree, if that was the Thing to be prevented; and that they ſhould agree to hurt us, could never be ſo certainly known till they had agreed; that we ſhould venture by any perfidious Step, by deſerting our Alliance with *France* to provoke that Crown; But if it could be foreſeen, that they might thus agree; was it not proper to ſecure ſo powerful an Ally as *France*, rather than by catching at any ſpecious and fallacious Offers, to deprive our ſelves of his Aſſiſtance? The ſame Diſpoſition that has influenc'd *Spain* to ſuch Meaſures as ſhe has taken, would in all likelihood have put her upon improving this Conduct to our greater Prejudice;

and

and the worſt of it is, for our Treachery, and Folly we ſhould have deſerved it.

How therefore *Spain* could be forced to ſubmit to the *Emperor*, becauſe *Great Britain refus'd the ſole Mediation*, is very dark and myſterious, notwithſtanding the Attempts of your moſt ingenious Correſpondent: for ſuppoſing it was ſincerely offer'd, the Refuſal was very juſtifiable, and ſupported by ſuch Reaſons, that *Spain* could not take it as the leaſt Token of Coolneſs, or any Breach of Friendſhip; and therefore could not have the leaſt Tendency to reduce her to ſuch Circumſtances of Diſtreſs, that ſhe ſhould be obliged *to purchaſe the* Emperor's *Friendſhip at any Rate*.

Nay the Refuſal could hardly be thought to give the leaſt Diſguſt to *Spain*, who never was known in any haſte before, to be reconciled to the *Emperor*, and had no more Reaſon to be ſo now than formerly, unleſs ſhe had ſome *new Views* and Proſpects, and ſuch as will hardly conſiſt with the Cauſes aſſigned by your Friend. For *Spain* was, as has been ſaid, upon good Terms with all her Neighbours, except theſe Diſputes with the *Emperor*, by the Treaties of *Utrecht*, the Quadruple, and particularly the Treaty of *Madrid* 1721. between *Great Britain*, *France* and *Spain*, by which they were as cloſely united, and engaged to *defend and guarantee each others Dominions, Kingdoms, and Eſtates all over the World*, as Treaties could bind them, and there was nothing in *ſending back the Infanta*, or *refuſing the ſole Mediation*, that could be conſtrued as a Breach of this Treaty, much leſs that could reduce *Spain* to the Neceſſity

Neceſſity of *purchaſing the* Emperor's *Friendſhip at any Rate.*

The Reaſoning therefore of your Friend ſeems to be very defective, and there is nothing in it that comes up to the Caſe. The Effect is much too great for the Cauſe, and has very little Connection with it. Such violent Proceedings, Stepping at once from the greateſt Enmity to the higheſt Friendſhip; Yielding of a ſudden Terms of Accommodation, which had been long refuſed, and adding great Advantages; Sacrificing old Freinds, together with the Faith of Treaties, and with the Honour of acting conſiſtently, are hardly known to ariſe from Reſentment of Affronts, or *Apprehenſion* and *Jealouſy* of imaginary Evils; ſo far *imaginary*, that the Friendſhip of ſufficient Powers, bound by Treaties, and by Intereſt too, ſtood in the Way of any Miſchief; nay ſo far *imaginary*, that the Grounds of Fear were never yet ſufficiently explained.

There are ſome Paſſions indeed that will go theſe Lengths, that may aim at great Things, and yet not take the beſt Means to obtain them; or that may diſpoſe to reſign great Advantages upon imaginary Hopes, as well as others upon imaginary Fears. Ambition when it prevails in ſome *weak Minds*, and where Nature never deſign'd it Entrance; and ſome Sentiments of Piety, when they have got the Place of *Heroick Vertue*, may for ought I know, prepare for any Impreſſions, and be ſo artfully managed, as to receive very extravagant Hopes, upon very ſmall Appearances of Probability: And it would be

be no difficult Matter upon ſuch Principles, to form a Scheme, as plauſible at leaſt as your Friends.

But if *Spain* thought the *Emperor*'s Friendſhip worth more than all the reſt of her Allies, becauſe ſhe had ſome favourite Deſigns which *his* might promote, and *theirs* would not. Or if *Spain* thought ſhe could get more by it than ſhe paid for it, either in real Advantages, or Acquiſitions ſhe was equally fond off, there will not be much wanting to account for this Alliance.

The Marriage of *Don Carlos* with the eldeſt Arch-Dutcheſs would bring home again all the Advantages now granted to the *Emperor*, every where, and with Improvement. The Reſtitution of *Gibraltar* would be an Equivalent for other Grants; and ſince *Spain* had no hopes of gaining it by Virtue of any Treaty, or Alliance, or Compact in being; it might not be improper to try what this *New Alliance* would do. And I hope its no abſurd Suppoſition that ſo pious a Prince, would not be backward to eſpouſe the *Pretender*'s Cauſe, to whom he had given ſuch ſingular Marks of his Friendſhip once before, and after he had ſhewn ſuch Offence at the King of *Great Britain*, without any Provocation; except the Miſchief he had drawn upon himſelf by former Obſtinacy.

But how does the *Courſe of Events* anſwer ſuch Views and Deſigns? Not ſo fully indeed as to leave no Room for Debates at this Diſtance; that would have been very ſurprizing; nor ſo fully as to leave us under the ſhameful Reflections of

our

our Indolence and Negligence. Whether the Reaſon has been, want of *Deſign* on their part; or want of *Care* on ours, every Man muſt judge for himſelf. But its very hard if the *Succeſs of our Fleets* muſt be made an argument to ſhow the *Innocence of our Enemies*, for *Enemies* they have been, or I fear a great many fine Turns in your Writings will be loſt. And if beſieging *Gibraltar*, when the Spaniards could not produce for it any Treaty, or Claim of Right, and nothing but what your Friend has thought fit to call by the looſe Name of *Pretenſions*, does not manifeſt a ſtrong Inclination to get it from us, right or wrong, I dont know what does.

It may not be improper however to take a little Notice of the State of *Europe* at this time, which was ſo unſettled, and by this New Alliance render'd more ſo; that the *Emperor* and *Spain*, and ſome Politicians of great Credit with both, might think it not unreaſonable to form hopes, by creating freſh Confuſion, and Diſturbances every where.

At leaſt the *Emperor* might improve the preſent State of Things to manage a Court, that by ſo large a Step of Submiſſion and Complaiſance had put themſelves into his Power.

Great Britain indeed was upon very good Terms both with the *Emperor* and *Spain*, as far as Treaties will go; but we know there are Principles in the World contrived to aboliſh the Force of Treaties upon proper Occaſions, and the *Courſe of Events* plainly ſhews all the Engagements of theſe Courts to *Great Britain*, and *Holland*, were of no Effect.

Could nothing be ſuggeſted to raiſe hopes of creating a Coolneſs and Jealouſy between *Great Britain* and *France*? Yet the *Courſe of Events* does as plainly ſhow, they thought *Holland* was to be frightned by *Menaces*, and *Pruſſia* to be gained by advantagious Offers, as other Things to which it is applied.

At this time you know great Efforts were made every where to diſtreſs the Proteſtants, and in many places to extirpate them. The Laws of the *Empire* were notoriouſly violated, and no Redreſs could be obtained. In the *Palatinate* they had ſuffer'd long Perſecution; and the Tragical Affair of *Thorn* (freſh in every one's Memory) was acted not long before this New Alliance. And is it contrary to Reaſon and Experience, to ſuppoſe the Succeſs this Party had met with, might encourage them to hope for more, and put them upon uniting thoſe two Powers, who by their Zeal and Influence are entitled to be chiefs in promoting their Deſigns?

The Affairs of the *North* might afford a very agreeable Proſpect, for *Sweden* had enter'd into a Defenſive Alliance with *Muſcovy* the Year before, and both were greatly concerned for the Duke of *Holſtein*, and had agreed to invite the *Emperor* to his Aſſiſtance; of which its plain, he hop'd to make an Advantage, becauſe he immediately enter'd into thoſe Treaties, to which he had ſhewn very little Regard, till this Alliance with *Spain* had alter'd his Views. And the *Courſe of Events* does ſufficiently ſhew, that being ſure of *Ruſſia*, he hoped to keep *Sweden* in Awe; and that they could never be

be prevailed upon to join with *Great Britain* and *France*, (who had both guaranteed the Dutchy of *Sleſwick* for *Denmark*,) againſt the Threats of ſuch terrible Neighbours as the *Ruſſians*; ſupported by a new Alliance with himſelf, and the Clamours of a ſtrong Party for the Duke of *Holſtein* at Home: ſo that the moſt vigorous Meaſures were abſolutely neceſſary to ſecure this Crown, of the utmoſt Importance to hinder all Attempts from the *North*.

And whether there was an Offenſive Alliance concluded at *Vienna*, or not, I think will hardly bear a Diſpute, ſince the *Courſe of Event*s has ſo manifeſtly ſhewn the Offenſive Deſigns of both the Allies. The whole Treaty was concluded without the Cognizance of thoſe Powers, who ought to have been informed, and who could not but wiſh well to it, if nothing was ſtipulated contrary to them: yet it was reported to be formed upon the Baſis of the *Quadruple Alliance*.

But great Preparations were immediately made by the new Allies; Treaties with the *Engliſh* and *Dutch* were manifeſtly violated: The *Emperor* who was Guarantee of all the Dominions belonging to the King of *Great Britain*, and conſequently of *Gibraltar*, agreed privately with *Spain* upon Meaſures to get it from us. The utmoſt Efforts were made to gain over the *Dutch* by Menaces and Promiſes; and the King of *Spain* writ to them in a Stile, that ſhew'd the ſtrongeſt Attachment to the *Emperor*, in his injurious Attempts of the *Oſtend* Company; and how far he had been made to believe, that by taking a little upon him, he could awe them to a Compli-

ance; ſubſcribing himſelf as in Declarations to his own Subjects, *I the King*. Like Meaſures were taken with *Sweden*, and advantagious Offers to engage *Pruſſia*; *Gibraltar* actually beſieged, and other Hoſtilities committed.

Can any Account be given of ſuch Steps, without ſuppoſing an Offenſive Diſpoſition: Or can it be imagined, that the Powers on both Sides ſhould really intend *Peace*, and yet not be able to underſtand one another. At the ſame Time, can any one queſtion, that *Great Britain* did not *heartily* and *vehemently* deſire *Peace*, and would not have been pleaſed at the *Vienna* Alliance, if it meant the *ſame Thing*: Or has *Great Britain*, before or ſince violated any Treaty; or inſiſted upon any Thing but the Obſervation of Treaties.

What therefore muſt we conclude, but that this ſurpriſing Alliance muſt ariſe from very different Views than what *ſending back the Infanta*, or *refuſing the ſole Mediation* could poſſibly ſuggeſt; that the *Emperor* and *Spain* have in all their late Proceedings ſhewn as great Enmity to this Nation as could well be conceived, and without any Provocation: That *Great Britain* has taken the fitteſt Meaſures to diſconcert their Projects, and yet has ſhewn the utmoſt Caution, and Tenderneſs not to exceed the Bounds of ſelf Defence; nor to do any Thing that might neceſſarily introduce, or even be made a plauſible Pretence for War.

If this Conduct is to be blamed, it muſt be for Want of Succeſs, and either becauſe it is better to hazard

hazard a *War*, or better to ſubmit to *ſhameful Conditions of Peace*, than to wait the Compliance and Reſolution of thoſe Powers, who have ſhewn ſome unaccountable Oppoſition indeed, yet with all their Dilatorineſs ſeem to have no Refuge nor Dependance left that can be ſure and laſting. It is to be hoped therefore, a little Time and Patience will produce the deſirable *Bleſſing*, which I heartily wiſh for the Common Intereſt; and particularly that you may have the *Joy* and *Satisfaction* of ſeeing the utmoſt Proſperity of your Country after all your Care and Sollicitude about it.

I am, &c.

ERRATA.

Page 6. Line 3. for *Queen* read *Princeſs of* Beaujolois. Line 29. for *thoſe* read *theſe*. Page 7. Line 12. for *much ſo* read *ſo much*. Line 15. for *ſet* read *ſit*. Line 19. for *thoſe* read *theſe*.